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RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTORS OF CORPORATIONS FOR WRONGFUL

AcTS. Editor American Law Register: The "Evening

Post" of

New York, in a note upon my article, "The Nature and Law of
Corporations," 38 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 137, while agreeing
generally with my conclusions and especially assenting to the statement that "the directors and not the stockholders should be held
primarily liable for the wrongful acts of corporations," nevertheless goes on to say that "whatever considerations of equity or
public opinion might seem to demand, nevertheless positive, written
law compels the court to take the position that it is to the stockholders that third persons must look as the corporate body which
has injured them. We do not think it would be safe to trust public
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feeling in this matter; Mr. Williams would seem to suggest that
we should;" concluding from this line of reasoning, although
with what sequence it is difficult to see, that "the true remedy is
not additional legislation, but care-on the part of stockholders in
the selection of directors and a lively interest in the management
and conduct of corporations."
I agree with the "Post" that as a rule man can be made neither
good nor happy by legislation, nor did I ever mean to suggest that
public feeling could always be trusted, but I endeavor to point out
that it is thefact, irrespective of either legislation or decisions of
the court, that a commercial corporation is composed of its
directors and not of its stockholders, and that, therefore, the
feeling of the people that such is the case is correct, while the
courts unfortunately have fallen into error.
The "Post" is also in error, I think, in .its statement that the
courts are controlled in this matter by statute ; on the contrary, asa rule, I think, the statutes are entirely silent on the question and
the courts are absolutely free (or were originally, although now
possibly bound by their own decisions), to impose upon the
directors their proper responsibility. What I recommended, therefore, was not an aitempt to make directors of corporations good by
statute, but merely by statute to confer upon the public the common
law right of action against persons wronging them; even though
such persons happen to be the directors of a corporation, and thus
to correct the error of the courts.
The suggestion of the -I Post" that the difficulty should be met
by more careful selection of directors by stockholders is aside the
question. What must be done is to impose upon directors their
proper responsibility, so they will be compelled for their own protection to be careful in their corporate acts. As a rule the directors
of corporations are men of good reputation and standing, the
trouble is the public is deceived thereby, since in many cases the
most respectable men seem to have no sense of personal responsibility when acting in a corporate capacity. It is a fact that the
directors are the corporation and act as such; proper liability for
their corporate acts when wrongful should be imposed upon them.
But the objection to the review by the "Post" really lies deeper.
The writer thereof apparently failed to read with any care the first
part of the article reviewed, wherein the nature of a corporation is
discussed and the foundation laid for the future argument. If he
had done so, he would have recognized that the conclusions followed as, of course, from such inquiry and that, therefore, any
criticism of the former should be based on a criticism of the latter.
Henry W.
W

illiams.

Baltimore; April, io, 899.
TAXATION; SITUS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY;

INTERSTATE Com-

MERCE. A Statute of Utah authorizes a tax upon cars owned outside the state but temporarily within it. Acting under this law the

NOTES.

board of equalization of the state assessed and valued ten cars belonging to the Union Refrigerator Transit Company and the tax
collector of Salt Lake County levied the tax apportioned to that
county.
In order to avoid seizure of the cars the transit company paid
the tax under protest and brought suit against the collector for recovery of same. Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Lynch,
County Treasurer, 55 Pac. (Utah) 639 (Dec. io, 1898). The

plaintiff claimed that the tax was illegally collected upon two
grounds, first, that plaintiff being a citizen of Kentucky, having no
place of business nor property within the State of Utah, except
these cars transiently there for the purpose of delivering or receiving
interstate freight and for no other purpose, that said cars had acquired no such situs within the borders of Utah as to give jurisdiction over them for purposes of taxation, and second, that such a
tax is a regulation of interstate commerce and repugnant to the
Federal Constitution. The defendant having demurred, the lower
coirt sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action, and upon
appeal this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah.
The court bases its decision'as to cars having acquired a situs for
purposes of taxation on two cases in the United States Supreme
Court, Pullman Palace"CarCo. v. Penna., 14 i U. S. x8 (i89o), and
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, z65 U. S. 194 (1896), and refusal of
the court to grant a rehearing in last case, Adams Ex. Co. v. Ohio,
x66 U. S. 185 (1896). While this would seem decisive upon the
point, an examination of these cases show that the question is a
much closer one than would appear from the uniformity of the decisions. In Pullman Palace CarCo. v. Penna., there was a vigorous
dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley in which Mr. Justice
Field and Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, while Mr. Justice Brown
took no part in the discussion, not having been a member of the
court when the case was argued.
In Adams Ex. Co. v. Ohio, a most elaborate and exhaustive dissenting opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice White in which Mr.
Justice Field, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brown concurred.
In the Pullman Case the majority of the court held a Statute of
Pennsylvania valid, imposing a tax upon the capital stock of the
Pullman Palace Car Company, taking as a basis of assessment such
proportion of its capital stock as the number of miles of railroad
over which its cars are run within the state bears to the whole number of miles in this and other states over which its cars are run.
The court held that no general principles of law are better settled
or more fundamental than that the legislative power of every state
extends to all property within its borders, and that for purposes of
taxation personal property may be separated from its owner, and
he may be taxed on its account at the place where it is, although not
the place of his own domicil, and even if he is not a citizen or a
resident of the state which imposes the tax. Also that it is equally
well settled that there is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the
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United States which prevents a state from taxing personal property
employed in interstate or foreign commerce like other personal
property within its jurisdiction, and cites in support of these propositions, among others, the cases of Gloucester Ferry Co. v.Penna.,
114 U. S. 196 (1884) ; Western Union TeL Co. v.Attorney GeneralofMass., 125 U. S. 530 (1887), and Moryev. B. & 0. R. R.,
127 U.
S. 117 (1887).

The court explains the exemption of ships engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce from local taxation by pointing out that commerce on sea is so different from commerce on land that the same
rules cannot be applied to both, and that a ship registered under the
laws of the United States at a particular port cannot acquire another
situs merely by touching at another port. Railroad Co. v.Maryland, 21 Wall. 456 (1874), is cited as so ruling this question as well
as, Harp v. Pacfc Mail S. S. Co., 17 How.596, and Morgan v.
Parham, I6 Wall. 471 (1872).
The court after showing that this

tax is a tax on property engaged in interstate commerce, and *nota
tax on a privilege, or on the goods or persons carried, and is therefore within the power of the state, holds that the mode of assessing
the proportion of the capital stock of the company represented by
their personal property in use in the state is a reasonable and valid
one and constitutional.
Mr. Justice Bradley, in his dissenting opinion, takes issue at once
with the majority of the court on the broad proposition that all
personal property within a state is subject to the taxing power of
the state. The rules applicable to independent nations are not
always applicable to the States of the Union. The rights of the
states are in many things restricted by the Constitution, and the
right of a state to tax interstate commerce is one of those restrictions. The learned justice concedes that all property, real or personal, within a state and belonging there may be taxed by the state,
but when property does not belong in a state another question arises.
To illustrate, he says: "a train of cars starts at Cincinnati for New
York and passes through Pennsylvania, it may be subject to police
regulations of that state, but it would be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States to tax it." Case of the State Freight
Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (1872) ; Coe v. Errol,ix6 U. S. 517 (1885).
...But when personal property is permanently located within
a state for the purpose of ordinary use or sale, then, indeed, it is
subject to the laws of the state and to the burdens of taxation ; as
well when owned by persons residing out of the state as when
owned by persons residing in the state. It has acquired a situs in
the state where it is found."
The justice points out that personal as well as real property may
have a situs independent of the owner's residence even when
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, as, for instance, an
office with its furniture of a steamship or railroad line. Such
property would be subject to the lex rei site and to local taxation.
But the ships or cars of those lines, being the vehicles of interstate
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-or foreign commerce, having no fixed or permanent sius or home,
except at the residence of the owner, cannot be taxed without an
invasion bf the powers and duties of the Federal Government,
-except where they belong; authorities to this effect being Hays
"v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596 (1854); Morgan v.
Parliam, 36 Wall. 471 (1872); Trans. Co. v. Wheeling, 99
U. S. 273 (1878). Mr. Justice Bradley then points out that the
-question involved in R. R. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 446, cited by
the majority of the court, was the power of a state-over a corpora.- ion created by it, in reference to its rate of fares and the remuneration it was required to pay to the state for its franchises, and that
-the question of the situs of the property could not arise. The
decision in Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penna., 114 U. S. 196, clearly
bolds that only the property of the corporation having a situs in
the state is taxable there, such as the wharf and ferry house, but
-the vehicles of commerce coming into the state or capital of the
-corporation is exempt. The learned justice, therefore, emphatically
asserts that while ships or railroad cars are not to be free from taxation, they are not taxable by those states in which they are only
transiently present in the transaction of their commercial operations. If this were not so a train of cars running from New York
-to Chicago could be taxed by every state through which they ran.
In the second case cited by the Supreme Court of Utah as
:authority for its decision, namely, Adams Express Co. v. Ohio,
x65 U. S. 194 (1896), the facts were as follows: AStatute of Ohio
authorized the board of assessors, in appraising the property of
,express companies, to ignore the return of actual value of personal
property by the company and to arrive at a basis of assessment by
taking the value of the entire capital stock of the company, or
entire value in money of the property of the company, and to
return for taxation such proportion of same as may be fairly said to
be represented by the value in money of the property within the State
of Ohio. The Adams Express Company returned for taxation real
-estate valued at $25,17o and personal property consisting of horses,
wagons, money, credits, etc., valued at $42,065. The board of
assessors found their capital stock at its market value was worth
about $16,ooo,ooo; that its gross receipts within the State of Ohio
for the year had been $282,i81, and that a fair proportion of its
-total property within the State of Ohio, valued in money, was
The Adams Express Company filed a bill in .the
$533,059.80.
United States Circuit Court to enjoin collection of the tax and the
prayer was granted. The State Supreme Court subsequently having
- affirmed the validity of the law, the Circuit Court reversed its
ruling and held that the assessments were valid. The Circuit Court
of Appeals having affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, the
ca was taken to the United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court,
affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. This was
not a regulation of interstate commerce, he held, because not a
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tax on the company's business, but a tax on its property. All corporations engaged in interstate commerce should bear their fair
share of the burdens of taxation, and as the court had repeatedly
held in the case of railroads and telegraph companies that their
property might be valued in the severial states through which their'
lines or business extended, for purposes of taxation, by taking into
consideration the uses to which it was put and all the elements
making up aggregate value, and that a proportion of the whole
fairly and properly ascertained might be taxed by the particular
state without violating any Federal restriction, so in this case no
more reason could be perceived for limiting the valuation of express
companies to horses, wagons and furniture, than that of railroads,
telegraph and sleeping-car companies, to roadbed, rails, ties, poles
and wires, or cars. The unity is a unit of use and management, and
the horses, wagons, safes, pouches and furniture; the contracts for
transportation facilities; the capital necessary to carry on the business, whether represented by tangible or intangible property, in
Ohio, possessed a value in combination -and from use in connection
with the property and capital elsewhere, which could as rightfully
be recognized in the assessment for taxation in the instance of these
companies as the others. The court then goes on to hold that the
situs of the property thus taxed is in the State of Ohio and is,
therefore, subject to its jurisdiction and its regulation, and cites,
among other cases, Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennd., x4
U. S. 18.
Mr. Justice White, in the dissenting opinion, starts out by laying
down two propositions which he designates as elementary: first,
that the taxing power of one government cannot be lawfully exercised over property not within its jurisdiction or territory, and
within the jurisdiction and territory of another; and, second, that
no state has any right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any
form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the
subject of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that
transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on.
He then points out that though the bill filed by the Adams Express
Company set forth that the value of their personal estate within
the State of Ohio was but $42,065, and the state by demurring
admits this to be so, yet the company had been assessed for taxation upon a valuation of $533,095.80. The learned justice then
says that this enormous increase in assessment- must have been
arrived at by going outside the state and taxing the capital stock
of the corporation proportioned to the business done in the state
to the entire business of the corporation. He directs attention to
the language of the Supreme Court of Ohio in affirming validity
of the law, in which they say: "The property of a corporation
may be regarded in the aggregate as a unit, an entirety, as a plant
designed for a specific object; and its value may be estimated, not
in parts, but taken as a whole."
And again, "If, by reason of the
goodwill of the concern, or the skill, experience or energy with
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which its business is conducted, the marked value of the capital
stock is largely increased, whereby the market value of the tangible
property of the corporation, considered as an.entire plant, acquires

a greater market value than it otherwise would have had, it cannot
properly be said not to be its true value in money within the
meaning of the constitution, because goodwill and other elements
indirectly enter into its value." He then points out that in considering the question of taxation in Pbstal Telegraph Cable Co. v.

Adams, .155 U. S.688, the United States Supreme Court said,
"The substance and not the shadow determine the validity of the
exercise of the power," and says the learned justice, "testing the
tax in controversy by the rule laid down in the Postal Telegraph
Case, it becomes in reason impossible to conclude otherwise than
that it is both in form and substance taxation by the State of Ohio
of property beyond its jurisdiction, and that it is also an imposition
by that state of a burden on interstate commerce."
raking up the so-called unit rule as applied to railroad and telegraph companies, and treating such applications of the rule as stare
decisis, he protests against its extension and shows that it could not
apply to an express company. "Inthe case of a railroad or telegraph
company there isphysical unity, but in case of an express company
operating horses and wagons in different states the only unity is a
metaphysical one. He illustrates the absurdity of such a metaphysical unity for purposes of taxation by supposing a banker in
New York to open an agency in NeW Orleans, equipping an office
with furniture worth $25o. The assessor on his next visit would
say to the agent, "It is true that your entire tangible property is
but $250, but by reason of your use of certain elements of wealth
in New York I will assess you at $i,ooo,ooo."
In conclusion, the learned justice protests against the argument
that we have entered upon a new era requiring new and progressive
adjudications, and unless the court admits the power of the State
of Ohio to tax to be as claimed, it will enable aggregations of
capital to escape just taxation by the several states. This assertion,
he says, is as unsound as the fictitious assertion'of expediency by
which it is sought to be supported.
This decision was so far-reaching and so far in advance of any
other decision relating to the situs of personal property for purposes of taxation, that the counsel in the case did not accept the
decision as final, but asked for a rehearing. It will be noted that
the court not only held that personal property situated in the state
was subject to state taxation, but that this tangible property by
reason of a uniy of use can draw to it intangible property, and that
both may be taxed.
The petition for a reargument was refused in Adams Express Co.
v. Ohio, i66 U. S. x85 (1896), in which the court, after reiterating its opinion that this was not a regulation of interstate commerce but an exercise of the state of its right to tax the property
of the eipres company, -,id down as a rule "that the capital
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stock of a corporation and the shares in a joint stock company
represent not only tangible property, but also intangible property,
including therein all corporate franchises and all contracts, privileges, and goodwill of the concern; and when, as in the case of.
the express company, the tangible property of the corporationi is
scattered through different states by means of which its business
is transacted in each, the situs of this intangible property is not
simply where the home office is, but is distributed where its tangible
property is located and its work is done." The temper of the
court in refusing the petition for reargument was apparently not
the best, for they stated emphatically that "no fine-spun theories.
about situs should interfere to enable these large corporations, whosebusiness is of necessity carried on through many states, from bearing in each state such burden of taxation as a fair distribution of
the actual value of their property among those states requires."
The court also explained that "whenever separate articles of
tangible property are joined together, not simply by 'unity of
ownership, but in unity of use there is not unfrequently developed
a property, intangible though it may be, which in value exceeds
the aggregate value of the separate pieces of tangible property."
It would almost seem from this that the court was ready to reverse
Euclid, had such action upon its part been necessary for the decision
in the case.
It will be seen, therefore, from the foregoing, that while the
decision of the Supreme Court of Utah is supported by decisions
of the highest court of the land, yet that court itself was far from
unanimous in arriving at these decisions, and it is by no means
improbable that at a later day, with a slight change in the membership of the court, the same question may be decided the
other way.
CRIMINAL

DISEASE.

LAW;

MANSLAUGHTER;

SPIRITUAL TREATMENT OF

After a lapse of twenty-two years the "Peculiar People"

have added another instance of manslaughter to their long series of
well meant homicides. The case of Queen v. Senior (Dec. io,
1898), [1899] 1 Q. B. 283, is of unusual interest because of the
altered positions assumed by the English court in regard to spiritual
remedies when applied in lieu of medical aid. The first case of
this nature arose in 1868, when parents were charged with manslaughter of a child because, pursuant to their beiRf as members of a
sect called "Peculiar People," they failed to provide medical attentions for their infant when it was suffering from acute inflammation

of the lungs. Instead, they prayed and anointed the child with
oil, but notwithstanding these devotional exercises the child died.
The court charged that there was a very great difference between
neglecting a child in respect to food, with regard to which there
could be but one opinion, and neglect of medical treatment, as to
which there might be many opinions; and cited the General
Epistle of Saint James (v. 14-15) upon which the Roman Church

NOTES.

founds the doctrine of extreme unction and the Mormons and
"Peculiar People" rest their practice of healing the sick by
anointing and prayer only, The jury accordingly brought in an
acquittal.

In the like case of Reg. v. Hurry (1892), 76 C. C. C.

Sessions Paper 63, a contrary result was reached, but in Reg. v.
Hines (1874), 8o C. C. C. Sessions Paper 309, Baron Pigot ex-

pressed a strong opinion that the indictment of a parent for omitting
to provide proper and sufficient medicine could not be sustained.
"That he may be one of those persons who have very perverted
views and very superstitious views, and may be altogether mistaking
that doctrine of Scripture from which he has taken his course of
proceeding in this case, may be perfectly true; but that there is
anything in the nature of a duty neglected, that is, a duty which he
knew or believed to be such, in this instance I am clearly of the
opinion the evidence does not show." If the community recognizes
medicine as a necessity, it is questionable whether the parent's
opinions should be considered, but the strength of the above argument is recognized by Coleridge, C. J., in Reg. v. Downs, [1875]
13 Cox C. C. iii, although a conviction was there sustained because of the Statue 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s.37. This makes itan
offence punishable summarily, if any parent willfully neglects to
provide medical aid for his child, being in his custody, under the
age of fourteen years, whereby the health of such child shall have
been seriously injured. The weight of opinion in these cases is
clearly to the effect that at common law medicine is not a necessity in
the sense that food or clothing are, and that a parent will not be held
responsible for withholding it if actuated by honest though erroneous motives. In the recent case of Queen v. Senior, the prisoner
was indicted for neglecting to provide medicine for his nine months'
old -child, who had died of diarrhoea and pneumonia. The father
was in most respects kind and careful but entertained an exaggerated idea of the power of prayer, and, like the Christian
Scientists, fancied the use of medicine indicated a want of faith in
the Lord. The Court of Queen's Bench in Banc sustained a verdict
of manslaughter, founded on the Statute 57 & 58 Vict. c. 41, s. 1,
which provides that " if any person over the age of sixteen years,
who has the custody, charge, or care of any child under the age of
sixteen years, wilfully . . . neglects . . . such child . . . in

a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary suffering, or injury
to its health, that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." It is
observable that medicine is not mentioned in this act which supersedes the earlier statute, and the court remarked that "the question
were narrowed down to whether his failure to provide medical aid
could be called neglecting the child so as to cause injury to its
health." Lord Russell, C. J., said, "I agree with the statement in
the summing up, that the standard of neglect varied as time went
on, and that many things might be ligitimately looked upon as
evidence of neglect in one generation, which would not have been
thought so in a preceding generation, and that regard must be had
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to the habits and thoughts of the time. At the present day, when
medical aid is within the reach of the humblest and poorest members of the community, it cannot reasonablybe suggested that the
-omissions to provide medical aid for a dying child does not amount'
to neglect." This ingrafting upon earlier decisions is accentuated
by the closing paragraph-'.' I wish to add that I dissent entirely
from the view attributed to Pigott, B., in Reg. v. Hines, and I was
not satisfied that, in the present case, therewas not sufficient evidence,
at common law, to justify a conviction." We thus have a decision
that failure to provide medicine for a child is culpable neglect in
the parent, and a strong intimation that it would be deemed such
neglect as to warrant a conviction of manslaughter at common law.
The thought naturally suggests itself as to how far this decision may
be applied to Christian Science practitioners. If the view be ac.cepted that an attempt to cure by prayer is foolhardy presumption
or gross negligence, it would seem in accordance with American
decisions (Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. x65 (1884)), that a Christian Scientist who advertises himself as a healer of diseases would be
culpable if, in the face of death, he were to apply no other remedy.
Further decisions will be watched with great interest for a solution
of this problem which is one of practical importance in those states
where spiritual treatment of disease is held not to be covered by
statutes regulating the practice of medicine.
INFANT AS BAILEE.
A recent decision in the Supreme Court of
Nebraska (Churchill v. Wk te, 78 N.W. 369) has augmented the
weight of authority with respect to this class of cases by holding
an infant (nineteen years of age) liable in tort for injuries done to
a hired horse and buggy. The contract of bailniet, it appeared,
contemplated a drive of five miles to a definite placi and return, in
breach of which the defendant drove fifty miles in an entirely
different direction and returned with both the horse and buggy
damaged.
The court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, that "the rule
that one who hires property of. this kind for one purpose, and uses
it for an entirely different purpose than that contemplated by the
parties in the contract of hiring, is liable for any harm that may
happen to it while using it, applies to minors as well as adults."
This decision is in strict accordance with *he trend of decisions
now followed in most states. The contrary doctrine, so strongly
upheld in Pennsylvania, is emphatically expressed by Rogers, J.,
in Penrose v. Curren, 3 Rawle, 351 (1832).
'" The foundation of the action is in contract, and, disguise it as you may, it is
an attempt to convert a suit originally in contract into a constructive tort, so as to charge the infant." This result is reached
by a strict adherence to the rule which frees infants from liability
on contracts for other than necessaries; it originated in the desire
of courts to protect or shield infants from the consequences to
which their youth and credulity might lead them. But when it

